We develop a theory of decidable inductive invariants for an in nite-state variant of the Applied π-calculus, with applications to automatic veri cation of stateful cryptographic protocols with unbounded sessions/nonces. Since in the presence of unbounded sessions any trace property becomes undecidable, we focus on (i) depth-bounded protocols, a generalisation of a class of in nite-state protocols proposed by D'Osualdo, Ong and Tiu; and (ii) downward-closed properties, which include many security properties such as absence of leaks of secrets. We study the structure of depth-bounded protocols within the framework of ideal completions for well-structured transition systems. Our main contribution is a class of expressions, called limits, that are shown sound and complete for representing in nite downward-closed sets of con gurations of depth-bounded protocols. We provide direct algorithms to prove that a given limit is an inductive invariant for a protocol. Inductive invariants of this form can be inferred, and represent an independently checkable certi cate of correctness. To evaluate whether the approach is viable, we provide a prototype implementation and we report on its performance on some illustrative examples.
Introduction
Security protocols are distributed programs that implement secure communication over insecure channels, by using cryptography. Despite currently underpinning virtually every communication over the internet, new aws that compromise security are routinely discovered in deployed systems. Many of these aws do not require breaking the cryptographic primitives, but instead exploit mistakes in the logic of their use in the protocol. Our goal is to prove that a protocol will be secure even against any possible a ack of an intruder that has full control of the insecure channel, under the assumption of perfect cryptography.
Veri cation of cryptographic protocols presents many challenges. First, cryptographic primitives need to be modelled algebraically, leading to messages being structured terms which can be constructed and deconstructed according to laws that capture properties of the underlying primitives. For example, a term e(m) k represents the message m encrypted with some symmetric key k, and is subjected to the law that m can be derived from e(m) k only if k is known. Moreover, the intruder has control over the network and can remember, intercept, analyse and forge any message sent through insecure channels. To deal with this scenario, the rst hard question to answer is "How do we represent the knowledge of the intruder and the messages that can be derived from it?".
Even with a solution to this question, there is a second important challenge to solve. Every session of a protocol introduces new messages and fresh nonces/encryption keys, which are all represented by restricted names νx in the π-calculus. It is important to model them as fresh distinct values since the security of protocols relies on being able to generate fresh unguessable nonces. is leads to the second hard question: "How can we nitely represent and manipulate an in nite state space with unboundedly many distinct names?"
In this paper, we take any algebraic formalisation of the cryptographic primitives as a parameter, and focus on solving this second question: the problem of capturing the possible evolutions of any number of sessions of a protocol, under arbitrary intruder interference.
It is well-known that, in general, in the presence of unbounded sessions, any veri cation problem becomes undecidable. A number of dedicated automatic veri cation tools, (e.g. DEEPSEC [9] , AVISPA [1] , SPEC [26] , AKISS [8] ) remedy to the obstacle of undecidability by only considering some given nite number sessions n. Usually, n is kept small as these tools do not scale well in the number of sessions. is restriction makes many veri cation problems decidable, enabling support for powerful classes of equivalence properties and cryptographic primitives, at the price of missing possible a acks.
Other tools, like the popular ProVerif [2] , overcome this problem by applying over-approximations (possibly giving false positives) and not guaranteeing termination of the analysis. Others, like Tamarin [19] , are not fully automatic and may require non-trivial human insight to construct proofs. When run in automatic mode, Tamarin is not guaranteed to terminate, and there is no characterisation of classes of protocols for which the automatic mode is complete.
We resolve the problem of undecidability by restricting protocols to the class of depthbounded protocols, for which we devise sound and complete algorithms. To gain some intuition on our approach, consider a protocol starting from some initial con guration P 0 . Assume that from P 0 , a new session S can be started between some participants sharing some secret k 0 , reaching the con guration P 0 νk 0 .S(k 0 ). Here, P 0 is still part of the con guration because other parallel sessions can be created, leading to con gurations P 0 νk 0 .S(k 0 ) · · · νk n .S(k n ) for arbitrary n. Suppose a session S(k i ), once terminated, restarts the same session with a refreshed secret k i : we have νk i .S(k i ) → * νk i .S(k i ) (νk i .R(k i )) where R(k i ) is just what remains, say in terms of intruder knowledge, of the session that just terminated. How could we represent the in nite set of reachable con gurations? We propose to have expressions L, called limits, that include the syntax of con gurations, but additionally have the construct L ω , which is a nite representation of the in nite set consisting of parallel compositions of arbitrarily many copies of con gurations in L. With this notation we could represent the e ect of running the session S(k i ) an arbitrary number of times by the limit L s = νk i .S(k i ) (νk i .R(k i )) ω . Notice that an instance of this limit contains an arbitrary number of distinct keys k i . Combining this with the initialisation of sessions by P 0 we get that the con gurations reachable from P 0 are all included in the limit L = P 0 L ω s , which has two nested ω. A natural question is: what are the classes of protocols that can be captured using limits? Our rst result is that limits are sound and complete representations of sets of con gurations for depth-bounded protocols. Intuitively, the depth of a con guration is the maximum length of "chains" of keys: for example, the set of messages Γ n = {e(k 1 ) k2 , e(k 2 ) k3 , . . . e(k n−1 ) kn } "chains" key k 1 to k 2 , k 2 to k 3 and so on, obtaining a chain of length n. In computing depth, we only consider chains that are essential: the set Γ n ∪ {k n } for example has depth 1 because it is equivalent to the set {k 1 , . . . , k n }. e depth of a protocol is the maximum depth of reachable con gurations. When there is a bound k on the depth of reachable con gurations, we say that the protocol is depth-bounded. It turns out that, for representing sets of con gurations of depth at most k, one needs limits with at most k nested ωs. Notably, we obtain this representation result without xing the set of cryptographic primitives. Instead, our model of protocols is parametric on the algebraic characterisation of any set of cryptographic primitives, provided it satis es some simple properties.
To turn this representation result into an analysis algorithm, we study how to automatically manipulate limits, which is not trivial since they represent in nite sets of con gurations. First, we establish decidability of inclusion between two limits, through a pumping-lemma style construction. Second, we prove with a similar technique that it is possible to compute, from a limit L, a limit post(L) that represent all the con gurations reachable in one step from con gurations in L. With these two building blocks, inclusion and post, one can decide whether a limit L includes all con gurations reachable from some P 0 by checking P 0 ∈ L and post(L) ⊆ L, i.e. L is an inductive invariant for P 0 .
We show how to devise a number of analyses on top of the inclusion/ post algorithms. Our results entail decidability of depth-boundedness (for given bounds), secrecy, and absence of misauthentications. We also show how to automatically infer inductive invariants from a protocol.
Our contributions In this paper we start a systematic study of the structure of cryptographic protocols with unbounded sessions/nonces, by contributing a principled theory of decidable inductive invariants for depth-bounded protocols.
To develop our theory of invariants, we make several technical contributions:
(1) we generalise the class of depth-bounded processes of D'Osualdo, Ong & Tiu [13] , by parametrising it in the choice of cryptographic primitives; (2) we prove that a class of expressions we call limits is sound and complete to represent downward-closed depth-bounded invariants; (3) we show decidability of inductiveness and use it to construct algorithms to decide secrecy and boundedness.
We built a proof-of-concept prototype tool and veri ed benchmark protocols. Our approach has a number of notable properties. First, once a suitable inductive invariant has been found, it can be provided as a certi cate of correctness that can be independently checked. Second, the search of a suitable invariant can be performed both automatically (with a trade-o between precision and performance) or interactively. ird, supporting unbounded nonces makes it possible to reason about properties like susceptibility to known-plaintext a acks (Section 3.1). Finally, even coarse invariants inferred with our method can be used to prune the search space of other model checking procedures.
Related work Depth boundedness was originally proposed and studied for the pure π-calculus in [20, 17] . Our work builds directly on [13] , which introduced the depth-bounded restriction for protocols that use symmetric encryption. [13] proves decidability of secrecy for those protocols, using a backwards search algorithm based on the theory of well-structured transition systems [16] . e backwards search has a number of drawbacks: it su ers from combinatorial explosion, is property-driven, which makes it di cult to reuse the result, and is monolitic, which means it cannot be used interactively/incrementally. In this paper, we signi cantly extend the de nition of depth-bounded protocols, by stating the general properties that the cryptographic primitives need to satisfy in order for the decidability results to apply. We carry out a deeper study of the structure of depth-bounded protocols by studying the structure of their ideal completions [15] . By means of a quite general pumping-lemma-style result ( eorem 6) we prove decidability of inductivity of downward-closed invariants. is allows the de nition of a forward veri cation algorithm that does not su er from the above drawbacks, and is a strictly more powerful analysis tool. For example, it can be used to prove both secrecy and depth-boundedness itself (for given bounds). e invariant based approach is also more exible in that we could propose more e cient invariant inference algorithms and the invariants themselves can be more easily manipulated as proof certi cates or integrated in other proofs.
Our theory of invariants is framed in terms of ideal completions [15] , which, to the best of our knowledge, has not been instantiated to cryptographic protocols before. Our decidability proofs introduce substantial new proof techniques to deal with an active intruder while being parametric on the cryptographic primitives. Even stripped of the complexity of handling cryptography, when applied to the simpler case of the pure π-calculus, our results contribute new, more direct and easy to implement algorithms for verifying depth-bounded concurrent systems, compared to e.g. [27] .
Manual veri cation using invariants was pioneered by [23] , with a method mechanised in Isabelle/HOL. Our approach could provide automatisation for some of the invariance lemmas required by the method.
ere has been work on proving security properties using type systems [12, 10, 11] . Types try to capture and generalise common safe usages of cryptographic primitives, and reduce veri cation to constraints which can be solved e ciently. We speculate that our domain of limits and the associated algorithms could be used to de ne an expressive class of solvable constraints that could be integrated in type systems.
ProVerif [2] is a popular tool for veri cation of security protocols with very good support for cryptographic primitives and a variety of security properties, including secrecy. ProVerif applies a number of approximations to translate protocols to Horn clauses. A well-known limitation due to these approximations is the inability to handle protocols with state. Our protocol model supports global state and private channels. In the presence of unbounded/sessions, ProVerif may report false a acks, or may not terminate. Its algorithm is known to terminate if the protocol satis es a syntactic condition called tagging [4] . Our approach does not apply approximations and guarantees termination, for the semantic class of depth-bounded protocols, which is incomparable with tagging. e Tamarin prover [19] is a semi-automatic proof assistant for veri cation of protocols with unbounded sessions/nonces. It supports any model of cryptographic primitives that can be expressed as subterm convergent rewriting systems, and was recently extended to support XOR [14] . e protocol model is based on multiset rewriting and is very close to our model. e tool may not terminate on a veri cation task, in which case it is possible to use it in interactive mode and provide human insight to complete a proof. To the best of our knowledge there is no characterisation for a class of protocols on which Tamarin is guaranteed to terminate. Tamarin's semi-algorithm is a symbolic backward search that uses proof normalisation to solve symbolic constraints on messages. Our theory of invariants can be used to improve Tamarin in two ways: rst, our algorithm could be used to prove inductive lemmas automatically; second the automatic inference of invariants could be used to prune the search space either by providing simplifying lemmas, or by applying sound restrictions to the traces.
Outline Section 2 introduces the formal model and our generalisation of depth-bounded protocols. Section 3 presents our main theoretical results. In Section 4 we discuss implementation and optimisations, and report on experiments with our tool. e omi ed proofs and de nitions can be found in the Appendix.
Formal model
We introduce a variant of the Applied π-calculus as our formal model of protocols. Following the Dolev-Yao intruder model, we treat cryptographic primitives algebraically. Let N be an enumerable set of names a, b, · · · ∈ N , which here will abstractly model data, nonces, and encryption keys. A signature Σ of constructors, is a nite set of symbols f with their arity ar(f) ∈ N. e set of messages over Σ, is the smallest set M Σ which contains all names, and such that if f ∈ Σ with ar(f) = n and M 1 , . . . , M n ∈ M Σ then f(M 1 , . . . , M n ) ∈ M Σ . We de ne size(a) := 1, size(f(M 1 , . . . , M n )) := 1 + max {size(M 1 ), . . . , size(M n )}, and names(a) := {a}, names(f(M 1 , . . . , M n )) := names(M 1 ) ∪ . . . ∪ names(M n ). Given X ⊆ N and s ∈ N, we de ne M Σ,X s := {M ∈ M Σ | names(M ) ⊆ X, size(M ) ≤ s}. We write K Σ for the set of nite sets of messages, K Σ := f (M Σ ); Γ, Γ and Γ, M stand for Γ ∪ Γ and Γ ∪ {M } respectively.
A substitution is a nite partial function θ : N M Σ ; we write θ = [M 1 /x 1 , . . . , M n /x n ], o en abbreviated with [ M / x], for the substitution with θ(x i ) = M i for all 1 ≤ i ≤ n. e application of substitution θ to the message M is denoted by M θ, and we extend the notation to sets of messages Γ θ := {M θ | M ∈ Γ }. A substitution θ is a renaming of X ⊆ N if it is de ned on X, injective, and with θ(X) ⊆ N .
De nition 1 (Intruder model). A derivability relation for a signature Σ, is a relation ⊆ K Σ × M Σ . e pair I = (Σ, ) is an (e ective) intruder model if is a (decidable) derivability relation for Σ, and for all M, N ∈ M Σ , Γ, Γ ∈ K Σ , a ∈ N :
e rst three axioms deal exclusively with what it means to be a deduction relation: what is known can be derived (Id); the more is known the more can be derived (Mon); what can be derived is known (Cut)-interpreted as a deduction rule this is the rule. e (Constr) axiom ensures the intruder is able to construct arbitrary messages by composing known messages. e (Alpha) axiom re ects the immateriality of the choice of names; it will justify α-renaming in our calculus. e (Relevancy) axiom will allow us to only consider boundedly many nonces maliciously injected by the intruder, at each step of the protocol.
In the rest of the paper, unless otherwise speci ed, we x an arbitrary e ective intruder model I and omit the corresponding superscripts.
Our framework uses the derivability relation as a black box and does not rely on the way it is speci ed (e.g. with a rewriting system or a deduction system). A common speci cation format uses constructors (e.g. enc for symmetric encryption) and destructors (e.g. dec for symmetric decryption) and a subterm convergent rewriting system specifying the interaction of the contructors and destructors; for example one would have the rewriting rule dec(enc(m, k), k) → m. Such a rewriting system would lead to a derivability relation over constructor-only terms, where a term M is derivable from Γ if there is a constructor/destructor combination of messages from Γ that rewrites to M . In some cases, messages are considered modulo an equational theory E, in which case one simply de nes a derivability relation that is closed under = E . Our results do not assume any particular presentation for the instances of derivability, but in our examples we nd it convenient to specify it with a sequent calculus in the style of [25] . is is an alternative to more intuitive natural-deduction-style rules, which has the key advantage of being -free, while admi ing . is simpli es considerably the proofs of properties (e.g. Lemma 4) of the intruder model.
Example 1 (Model of Encryption).
A model of symmetric and asymmetric encryption can be given using the signature Σ en = {(·, ·) , e(·) · , a(·) · , p(·)}, where (M, N ) pairs messages M and N , e(M ) N represents the message M encrypted with symmetric key N , a(M ) N represents the message M encrypted with asymmetric key N , and p(K) is the public key associated with the private key K. e intruder model for (a)symmetric encryption is the model I en = (Σ en , ) where is de ned by the deduction rules in Fig. 1 .
Proposition 2. e model Σ en is an e ective intruder model.
A calculus for cryptographic protocols
A common approach to model cryptographic primitives is to consider both constructors (e.g. encryption) and destructors (e.g. decryption). Here messages only contain constructors, and "destruction" is represented by pa ern matching. Fix a nite signature Q of process names (ranged over by Q) each of which has a xed arity ar(Q) ∈ N. A protocol speci cation consists of an initial process P and a nite set ∆ of (possibly recursive) de nitions of the form Q[x 1 , . . . , x n ] := A, with ar(Q) = n, where the syntax of P and A follows the grammar:
We use the vector notation x = x 1 , . . . , x n for lists of pairwise distinct names. In an action a( x : M ).P , we call x : M the pa ern, and P the continuation; processes Q[ M ] are called process calls. If Γ = {M 1 , . . . , M k } is a nite set of messages, then Γ := M 1 . . . M k . We de ne P 0 := 0 and P n+1 := P P n . For brevity, we assume the special name in is known to the intruder. e internal action τ , is an abbreviation for in(x : x), for a fresh x. Processes of the form M or Q[ a] are called sequential. e names x are bound in both ν x.P and in( x : M ).P . We denote the set of free names of a term P with fn(P ) and the set of bound names with bn(P ). As is standard, we require, wlog, that fn(P ) ∩ bn(P ) = ∅. When nesting restrictions ν x.ν y.P , we implicitly assume wlog that x and y are disjoint. We assume there is at most one de nition for each Q ∈ Q, and that for each de nition Q[x 1 , . . . , x n ] := A, fn(A) ⊆ {x 1 , . . . , x n }. e set P consists of all processes over an underlying signature Q.
Structural congruence We write α = for standard α-equivalence. Structural congruence, ≡, is the smallest congruence relation that includes α =, and is associative and commutative with respect to and + with 0 as the neutral element, and satis es the standard laws:
e second law is called exchange, the third scope extrusion. Note that the only structural law that modi es the messages is α-equivalence; the axiom (Alpha) ensures that α-equivalence preserves derivability. Every process P is congruent to a process in standard form:
where every name in x occurs free in some subterm. We write sf(P ) for the standard form of P , which is unique up to α-equivalence, and associativity and commutativity of parallel. We abbreviate standard forms with ν x.( Γ Q) where all the active messages are collected in Γ , and Q is a parallel composition of process calls. Let sf(P ) be the expression (SF), we de ne msg(P ) = {M 1 , . . . , M m } ∪ n i=1 N i . us msg(P ) is the set of messages appearing in a term. When m = 0, k = 0, x = ∅, the expression (SF) is 0.
Reduction semantics One can think of standard forms ν x.( Γ Q) as runtime con gurations of the protocol. ey capture, at a speci c point in time, the current relevant names (which encode nonces/keys/data), the knowledge of the intruder Γ , and the local state of each participant. A sequential term Q[ N ] represents a single participant in control state Q with local knowledge of messages N .
Principals can communicate through channels; a channel known by the intruder is considered insecure. An input action over an insecure channel can be red if the intruder can produce any message that matches the action's pa ern. An output c M to an insecure channel c leaks message M to the intruder, who can decide to forward it angelically to a corresponding input over c (modelling a honest step) or hijack the communication.
We Because of (Relevancy), in Rule P I we can assume wlog that y includes only names that appear in M . e sets traces ∆ (P ) := {Q 0 · · · Q n | P ≡ kn Q 0 → ∆ · · · → ∆ Q n } and reach ∆ (P ) := {Q | P → * ∆ Q} collect all the transition sequences from P and the processes reachable from P respectively, given the de nitions ∆. When the context makes it unanbiguous, we omit ∆.
Remark 1 (Implementable Pa erns). Our calculus represents message deconstruction (e.g. decryption) with pa ern matching. However, general pa ern matching is too powerful: a pa ern like in(x, k : e(x) k ) would obtain both the key k and the plaintext x from an encrypted message! is is only a modelling problem: one should make sure all pa erns can be implemented using the cryptographic primitives. Consider a pa ern x : M and let Z = names(M ) \ x; the pa ern is implementable, if, for all θ : Z M, we have M θ, Zθ y for all y ∈ x.
Knowledge congruence We introduce a coarser relation than structural congruence that we call knowledge congruence P ≡ kn Q, which is the smallest congruence that includes ≡ and such that
Knowledge congruence can also be characterised by
Intuitively, modulo derivability, two processes P ≡ kn Q are indistinguishable to the intruder and to the principals. Formally, if P ≡ kn Q then the transitions systems (P, → ∆ ) and (Q, → ∆ ) are isomorphic. We thus close the reduction semantics under knowledge congruence: we add the rule that if P ≡ kn P → ∆ Q ≡ kn Q then P → ∆ Q. While knowledge congruence captures when two con gurations are essentially the same, knowledge embedding formalises the notion of "sub-con guration".
De nition 2 (Knowledge embedding). e knowledge embedding relation
Proposition 3. P 1 ≡ kn P 2 if and only if P 1 kn P 2 and P 2 kn P 1 . eorem 1. Knowledge embedding is a simulation, that is, for all P , P and Q, if P → Q and P kn P then there is a Q such that P → Q and Q kn Q . Example 2. Consider the following toy protocol, given in Alice&Bob notation, meant to establish a new session key K between A and B through a trusted server S: Figure 3 shows the protocol formalised in our calculus. Assume the initial state is
Example 2 is initiated by A 1 which sends some new name n a to the server; since communication is over an insecure channel, the message is just output without indicating the intended recipient. e server receives the message (or any message the intruder may decide to forge instead) and outputs the fresh key k encrypted with k bs (the long-term key between B and S) and with the pair (n a , k as ) (note the use of non-atomic encryption keys). In the protocol, these two messages are sent to B but we model Example 2 by B 1 which just receives the message relevant to B. e forwarding of e(k) (na,kas) from S to A is performed by the intruder instead of B in the model.
In the last two steps, modelled by B 2 , A 3 , B sends a nonce n b encrypted with k, to challenge A to prove she knows k, which she does by sending back e(n b ) (k,k) . At this point, B is convinced that by encrypting messages with k they will be only accessible to A. We model this by making B 2 transition to Secret[k] a er a successful challenge. We always assume the de nition
is only possible when the intruder can derive k so we can check whether the secrecy assertion holds by checking that no reachable process contains a call to Leak[k].
Notice how A 1 and B 1 spawn both the continuation of the session and (recursively) a process ready to start a new session. is creates the possibility of an unbounded number of sessions, each of which will involve fresh n a , n b , and k.
reat model Our reduction semantics follows the Dolev/Yao a acker model in representing the intruder's interference: the intruder mediates every communication over insecure channels, is able to create new names and analyse and construct messages from all the messages that have been communicated insecurely so far. reat models that go beyond Dolev/Yao include dishonest participants and compromised old session keys. ese aspects are not embedded in the semantics, but can be modelled through the process de nitions. If we wanted to model compromised keys in Example 2, for instance, we could modify the de nition of B 2 to B 2 [a, b, k bs , n b , k] := in(e(n b ) (k,k) ).Secret[k]+in(e(n b ) (k,k) ). k which makes a non-deterministic choice to declare k a secret, or to consider it as old and reveal it. e next example shows how to represent private/public key pairings and a dishonest participant.
Example 3 (Public key scenario). We illustrate a typical modelling pa ern by formalising a simple protocol where a server issues a fresh key to two parties encrypting it with their public key. e pairing between private and public keys is represented by processes K[s, x, pk x ] := s x, pk x .K[s, x, pk x ] which is used as K[s, a, p(k a )] to advertise the pairing a, p(k a ) between identity a and its public key p(k a ) securely over the private storage channel s (the pairing is trusted). e server non-deterministically picks two identities and their public keys and issues a new session key for them:
where C[c, m] := c m . e two principals run the same code, waiting for the issued key
. e initial state makes the identities and the public keys public, and includes an intruder identity i with private key k i which is also public (i.e. known by the intruder) and from which the public key p(k i ) can be derived.
Notice that there is a legitimate record of the pairing i, p(k i ) which every honest party trusts. To model unboundedly many parties one can de ne Init[i, k i ] := τ .(Sys Init[i, k i ]) to generate arbitrarily many copies of Sys.
Depth-Bounded Protocols
We generalise the de nition of depth-bounded protocols, rst introduced in [13] . Our theory of invariants is sound and complete for this class of protocols.
De nition 3 (Depth). e nesting of restrictions of a term is given by the function
e depth of a term is de ned as the minimal nesting of restrictions in its knowledge congruence class, depth(P ) :
Consider for example
c ) which has nest ν (P ) = 3. e process P is knowledge-congruent to Q = (νa. a νb. b νc. c ) which has nest ν (Q) = 1; this gives us depth(P ) = nest ν (Q) = 1. Although bn(Q) = {a, b, c}, by α-renaming all names to x we obtain Q = (νx. x νx. x νx. x ) which has the property |bn(Q )| ≤ nest ν (Q) ≤ depth(P ). More generally, Lemma 1 says that processes of depth k can always be represented by only using at most k unique names, by reusing names in disjoint scopes.
Let S s := {P ∈ P | ∀M ∈ msg(P ) : size(M ) ≤ s} be the set of processes containing messages of size at most s. e set D X s,k is the set of processes of depth at most k ∈ N, with free names in X, and messages not exceeding size s:
When starting from some initial process P 0 , every reachable process P has fn(P ) ⊆ fn(P 0 ) so X can always be xed to be fn(P 0 ). We therefore omit X from the superscripts to unclu er notation. e set of processes reachable from P while respecting a size bound s is the set
De nition 4. For some s, k ∈ N, we say the process P is (s, k)-bounded (w.r.t. a nite set ∆ of de nitions) if reach s ∆ (P ) ⊆ D s,k , i.e. from P only processes of depth at most k can be reached, in traces respecting the size bound s.
Note that the two bounds s and k are very di erent in nature. Bounding the size of the messages restricts the traces that we are going to consider: if some behaviour can only be exhibited by using messages exceeding size s, then that behaviour is ignored. When considering the rest of the behaviour, we then check if all the reachable processes have depth at most k. If so, the initial process is (s, k)-bounded. is de nition has two important implications. First, we are going to only be sound with respect to bugs that can be triggered without using messages that exceed s in size. Second, the property of being (s, k)-bounded is not static. Proving that P is (s, k)-bounded, requires characterising the whole set of reachable processes. Section 3.1 explains how our theory of invariants can prove boundedness.
Example 4.
e protocol in Example 2 is (3, 7)-bounded. We defer the proof of this fact to Section 3.6.
) leads to unboundedness as soon as the initial process contains E[k] for some k not known to the intruder, and size bound such that x can match messages of size greater than 1. In such case, the intruder can inject messages (c i , c i+1 ) for unboundedly many i, where c i are intruder-generated nonces. Since k is secret, the resulting reachable con gurations would contain "encryption chains" of the form νk.
. When such chains appear in a set for unboundedly many n ∈ N, the set is not depth-bounded. is encryption oracle pa ern could be considered an anti-pa ern because it can be exploited for a chosen-plaintext a ack on the key k. e pa ern can be usually modi ed or constrained to obtain a bounded protocol. One option is to limit the veri cation to only consider traces where x is of size 1. is is a common solution in typed models; for instance, in Tamarin one would specify type x:fresh, achieving the same result of restricting substitutions to only replace nonces for x. Another solution is to modify the input action to in(x : e(x) sk ) for some key sk shared between an honest principal and the oracle. In Section 5, we elaborate on extensions of boundedness that can handle the oracle pa ern without these patches.
Ideal Completions for Security Protocols
Our main technical contributions are the proofs needed to show that (s, k)-bounded protocols form a completion-post-e ective class of WSTS, in the sense of [6] . First we outline the signi cance and applications of this result, and then proceed with the proofs.
Downward-closed Invariants and Security Properties
Suppose we want to establish that a protocol P ful lls some security requirement. In a typical proof, one needs to establish many intermediate facts about executions of the protocol. For example, part of the argument may hinge on some key k being always unknown to the intruder.
is kind of property is an invariant of the protocol: it holds at every step of an execution. Formally, an invariant of P (under de nitions ∆ and size constraint s) is any set of processes that includes reach s ∆ (P ). For example, k is never leaked to the intruder in executions of the protocol P if the set of processes S k := {Q | k kn Q} -i.e. all the processes where k is not public-is an invariant of P . We will focus here on the class of kn -downward-closed invariants. Formally, given a set of processes X, its kn -downward closure is the set X↓ :
Many properties of interest are naturally downward closed. For example, the set S k above is downward-closed as k kn Q and Q kn Q implies k kn Q . Intuitively, if k is secret in Q and Q kn Q then k is secret in Q . e problem we need to solve is, then, how to show that a given downward-closed set X is an invariant for a given protocol. Formally, that corresponds to checking X ⊇ reach s ∆ (P ) which, by downward-closure of X, is equivalent to checking X ⊇ reach s ∆ (P )↓. To prove the la er inclusion, our strategy is to nd an inductive invariant that includes the initial state P and that is included in X. Let post s ∆ (X) := {Q | ∃Q ∈ X, Q → Q ∈ S s } be the set of processes reachable in one step from processes in X.
Any inductive invariant that contains the initial process P will include reach s ∆ (P ). To turn this proof strategy into an algorithm, we need three ingredients:
1. a recursively enumerable nite representation of downward-closed sets, 2. a way to decide inclusion between two downward-closed sets, given their representation, 3. an algorithm (called post s ∆ ) to compute, given the nite representation of a downwardclosed set D, the nite representation of post s ∆ (D)↓. Unfortunately, downward-closed sets cannot be nitely represented in general, especially if one considers unbounded sessions/nonces. We will show, however, that we can devise solutions to all three items above for downward-closed subsets of D s,k , under a mild restriction on the intruder model.
Solving problems 1 to 3 amounts to proving that D s,k admits a post-e ective ideal completion in the sense of [15, 6] . Before moving to the proofs, we give some examples of applications. Suppose we provide solutions for problems 1 to 3 above for D s,k . en we can decide if the reachable con gurations satisfy any given downward-closed property, by adapting the enumeration scheme presented in [6] . eorem 2. Given a property D ⊆ P, and a protocol P with de nitions ∆, we write P,
e algorithm runs two semiprocedures, Prover and Refuter, in parallel. e rst procedure, Prover, enumerates all the downward-closed subsets I of D s,k . For each I, Prover checks if (a) P ∈ I, (b) I is inductive, and (c) I ⊆ D. If we nd such a set I, then we have proven reach ∆ (P ) ⊆ D, and the overall algorithm can terminate returning "True". e second procedure, Refuter, enumerates all Q ∈ reach ∆ (P ) and checks if Q ∈ D, in which case the overall algorithm can terminate returning "False".
When P, ∆ |= s D holds, then, in the worst case, Prover will eventually consider the nite representation of reach s ∆ (P )↓, which satis es checks (a) to (c) above. In the case where P, ∆ |= s D does not hold, Refuter would eventually nd a reachable process not in D. In either case, the algorithm terminates with the correct answer. e above algorithm can be used to prove the following security properties.
Deciding control-state reachability and secrecy Control-state reachability asks whether there is an execution of the protocol which reaches a process containing a process call Q[. . .] for some given Q. Secrecy can be reduced to control-state reachability by introducing a de nition Secret[m] := in(m).Leak[m] (for a special process identi er Leak with no de nition). In the de nition of the protocol one can call Secret[m] to mark some message m as a secret, and secrecy corresponds to asking control-state (un)reachability for Leak.
If P is (s, k)-bounded, control-state reachability for Q from P , can decided by P, ∆ |= s D Q , where D Q is the (downward-closed) subset of D s,k of processes that do not contain calls to Q. Notice that, when P is arbitrary, the algorithm checks (s, k)-boundedness and control-state reachability at the same time.
Absence of misauthentication A misauthentication happens when a principal a believes she shares a secret n with b but b believes she shares the secret n with some other entity c. To check this situation can never arise, we can produce the process Auth[a, b, n] when a believes to share the secret n with b. Absence of misauthentication can be decided by P, ∆ |= s A where
Susceptibility to known-plaintext attacks e task of guessing a symmetric key is made much easier if it is possible for the a acker to have access to an arbitrarily large number of known messages encrypted with the same key k. We can model this situation by asking whether ∀n ∈ N :
. If ( †) holds for P then the intruder does have access to an unbounded supply of known messages m encrypted with the same key k. Interestingly, the property becomes meaningful only when considering unbounded number of nonces. Condition ( †) is equivalent to reach s ∆ (P )↓ ⊇ {R n | n ∈ N}↓. If we nd a downward-closed inductive invariant I for P , such that I ⊇ {R n | n ∈ N}↓, then we can be sure that ( †) does not hold, and P is not susceptible to known-plaintext a acks on k. We can therefore semi-decide ( †) by enumerating all candidate I. Contrary to the previous algorithms, we are not able to provide a Refuter procedure (we conjecture the problem is undecidable).
Notice how, in all the cases above, if the protocol is found to satisfy the property, the algorithm can output an inductive invariant acting as an independently checkable certi cate of correctness and providing the foundations to prove further properties. e presented algorithms rely on expensive enumeration schemes, which are mainly a theoretical device to prove decidability. In a more practical se ing, the candidate invariants can be supplied by the user and re ned interactively, avoiding the need for the enumeration of Prover, or they can be inferred as we describe in Section 4.
Bounded processes are well-quasi-ordered
We will construct nite representations of downward-closed invariants by making use of the algebraic structure of the quasi-order (D s,k , kn ). A relation ⊆ S × S over some set S is a quasi-order (qo) if it is re exive and transitive. An in nite sequence s 0 , s 1 , . . . of elements of S is called good if there are two indexes i < j such that s i s j . e sequence is called bad if it is not good. When the qo (S, ) has no bad sequences it is called a well quasi order (wqo). In [13] it is shown that (D s,k , kn ) is a wqo, when considering the intruder model I en . We re ne the result, and generalise it to arbitrary intruder models.
We prove (D s,k , kn ) is a wqo for any intruder model, by showing a correspondence between processes in D s,k and nitely-labelled forests of height at most k, which we represent as nested multisets.
Multisets We say a function µ : X → N is nite-support if its support supp(µ) := {x | µ(x) > 0}, is nite. Given a set X, the multisets over X, µ ∈ M(X), are the nite-support functions from X to N. Assume (X, ) is a quasi order; its multiset extension is the quasi order M over M(X) de ned as follows; for two multisets µ 1 ,
. When X is a nite set ordered by equality, M coincides with multiset inclusion. If (X, ) is a wqo then (M(X), M ) is a wqo [15] . Forests We de ne a domain of forests F X s,k with sequential processes in B s (X) as leaves:
e set B s (X) contains all sequential processes of D X s,k . In the base case, forests of height 0, F X s,0 is simply a multiset of sequential processes. Forests of height k + 1 are represented in F X s,k+1 by a multiset of sequential processes and of subforests of height k. For any given s ∈ N and nite X ⊆ N , B s (X) is a nite set and thus forms a wqo with equality. With F (forest embedding) we denote the qo over F X s,k de ned as follows: on F X s,0
it coincides with the multiset extension of equality on B s (X); on F X s,k+1 it coincides with the multiset extension of the disjoint union of equality on B s (X), and the forest embedding on
. By iterating the result on multisets, we obtain that for any s, k ∈ N and nite X ⊆ N , (F X s,k , F ) is a wqo. e function Fk , transforms a process P with nest ν (P ) ≤ k into its forest encoding, that is a forest that faithfully represents the structure of P .
De nition 5 (Forest encoding). We de ne the function Fk which transforms a process P with nest ν (P ) ≤ k into a forest:
assuming {x 1 , . . . , x k } ∩ (bn(P ) ∪ fn(P )) = ∅; when this assumption is not met because of bound names, we implicitly α-rename the term before applying the de nition. When nest ν (P ) > k, F P k is unde ned. Figure 4 illustrates forest encodings. e forests in F Y s,k have sequential processes as leaves (with messages have size smaller than s), and free names Y {x 1 , . . . , x k }. Lemma 1 is used to only have to use k distinct bound names: this makes the forests nitely labelled. Proof. Let P 1 , P 2 , . . . be an in nite sequence of processes in D Y s,k . By de nition, for all i ∈ N there exists a process Q i ∈ S s such that Q i ≡ kn P i and nest ν (Q i ) ≤ k, which implies by Lemma 2 that F Q i k ∈ F Y s,k . e sequence F Q 1 k , F Q 2 k , . . . must then be a good sequence since (F Y s,k , F ) is a wqo. erefore, there are i, j ∈ N with i < j, such that F Q i k F F Q j k , which by Lemma 3 implies Q i kn Q j . We therefore have P i kn P j which proves that the sequence P 1 , P 2 , . . . is good.
Limits and Ideal Decompositions
In this section, we exploit the wqo structure of D s,k to provide a nite representation for its downward-closed sets. Let (S, ) be a qo. A set D ⊆ S is an ideal if it is downward-closed and directed, i.e. for all x, y ∈ D there is a z ∈ D such that x z and y z. We write Idl(S) for the set of ideals of S. It is well-known that in a well-quasi-order, every downward-closed set is equal to a canonical minimal nite union of ideals, its ideal decomposition. To represent downward-closed sets of D s,k we will only need to provide nite representations of its ideals. We represent ideals using limits, which have the same syntax as processes augmented with a construct -ω to represent processes with arbitrary number of parallel components.
De nition 6 (Limits). We call limits the terms L formed according to the grammar: 
We call the processes in L instances of L. De ne nest ν (L) to be as nest ν on processes with the addition of the case nest ν (L ω ) := nest ν (L). It is easy to check that for each P ∈ L , depth(P ) ≤ nest ν (L). We write L X s,k for the set of limit expressions L with free names in X that have nest ν (L) ≤ k and do not contain messages of size exceeding s. We o en omit X and understand it is a xed nite set of names.
We now prove that each denotation of a limit is an ideal, and every ideal is a denotation of some limit, i.e. Idl(D s,k ) = L s,k . is makes nite unions of limits a sound and complete representation of downward-closed sets of D s,k .
To be er manipulate limits, we introduce the n-th grounding L n of a limit L, de ned in Fig. 5 . Grounding can be thought as replacing each -ω with -n ; e.g. e idea of the proof is to use the forest encoding F -to apply known facts about the ideal completion for multisets to our se ing. We take an ideal of D s,k and show it corresponds to a downward closed set of F s,k , via forest encoding. For multisets, we know exactly how to represent ideals [15] , i.e. -products. ese products are expressions that can be translated to limits.
Decidability of Inclusion
We have established that we can nitely represent downward-closed sets of D s,k using limits. Now we turn to decidability of inclusion between downward-closed sets. We will make use of the following well-known property of ideals: for any D,
Assume we are given the ideal decomposition of two downward-closed sets
As a consequence, it su ces to show that inclusion of ideals is decidable.
We extend structural congruence to limits in the obvious way, with laws for parallel and restriction analogous to the process case, and the addition of the law M ω ≡ M . It is easy to check that L ≡ L implies L = L . We can de ne a standard form for limits: every limit is structurally congruent to a limit of the form ν
where every name in x occurs free at least once in the scope of the restriction, and for all j ∈ J, B j is also in standard form. When we write sf(L) α = ν x.( Γ Q R) we imply that Q is a parallel composition of process calls i∈I Q i [ M i ] (in which case we write |Q| for |I|) and R is a parallel composition of iterated limits j∈J B ω j . e absorption axiom e decidability proof hinges on a characterisation of inclusion that requires an additional hypothesis on the intruder model. For the rest of the paper, we assume an absorbing intruder model. e absorption axiom has a technical de nition, which becomes more intuitive if understood in the context of limits of the form L = ν x.( Γ Q) ω . Imagine comparing the di erence in knowledge between L 1 and L 2 : we have sf(
e absorption axiom tells us that if we want to check whether a process ν x. M is embedded in sf( L 2 ), we only need to check if M is derivable from Γ and we can ignore Γ . In other words, we only need to check if ν x. M is embedded in L 1 .
We are now ready to prove our main result: a small model property that shows decidability of limit inclusion. Let us present the intuition rst with a simple example. To manipulate limits with ωs, we introduce a variant of grounding called the n-th extension L⊗n, de ned in Fig. 5 . An extension L⊗n produces a new limit with each sublimit B ω unfolded n times, while also keeping the sublimit B ω . Note that extension does not alter semantics: L = L ⊗ n . Now consider the simpler problem of deciding inclusion when one of the limits is a single process P , i.e. deciding if
the ω twice, obtaining the equivalent limit L ⊗ 2 ≡ νx 0 ,
. e idea is that we can match P against the xed part of L ⊗ 2:
e rst observation is therefore that if we can nd some m such that P is embedded in the xed part of L ⊗ m, we have proven P ∈ L . To turn this into an algorithm, we need to prove that there exists an n so that if we failed to embed P in the xed part of L ⊗ m, for any m ≤ n then P is not going to embed in L ⊗ m for every m , and therefore P ∈ L . In other words, we need to know that a er some threshold n, there is no point trying with bigger extensions. Take for example P = νx, y.(B[x, y]||B[y, x]) and L = (νx, y.B[x, y]) ω . We can try and embed P into L ⊗ 2 but we would fail as the xed part expands to νx 0 , y
It is easy to see that expanding further would not introduce new pa erns in the xed part of the limit which would help embed P . eorem 6 formalises and generalises this intuition to the general problem of inclusion between two arbitrary limits L 1 and L 2 : it proves that the threshold for expansion is the number of xed restrictions of L 1 plus the number of xed process calls of L 1 , plus one; and it makes use of the absorption axiom to prove the threshold is sound even in the presence of knowledge. eorem 6 (Characterisation of Limits Inclusion). Let L 1 and L 2 be two limits, such that sf(L 1 )
, and let n = | x 1 | + |Q 1 | + 1. en:
Proof. eorem 6 leads to a recursive algorithm. Given L 1 and L 2 , one computes sf(L 1 ) and sf(L 2 ⊗ n). For every α-renaming that makes condition (A) hold, one checks condition (B) (recursively). If no renaming makes both true then the inclusion does not hold. In the recursive case, there are fewer occurrences of ω in the limit on the le , eventually leading to the case where L 1 has no occurrence of ω, and only condition (A) needs to be checked.
Example 6 (Limit inclusion). Consider the following two limits:
We prove that L 1 ⊆ L 2 by applying the recursive algorithm from eorem 7. By eorem 6, here the threshold for expansion is n = 2, but we will try with n = 1. In case we succeed, the inclusion holds. If not, we might have to increase n up to 2. is results in To try and match the xed part of L 1 with L 2 ⊗ 1, we could α-rename x 1 to y 1 . is works for (A) but the remaining goal (B) cannot be shown as it does not hold because we cannot derive e(x 2 ) y1 from the knowledge on the right-hand side:
Choosing the α-renaming [x 1 /y 3 ] leaves us instead with:
which holds. It su ces to expand the la er limit by 1 and choose the renaming [x 2 /y 2 ]. en, e(x 1 ) x2 ≤ kn x 1 , x 2 holds and the process calls match. Note that it is crucial to keep A[x 1 ] ω on the right side.
Computing Post-Hat
e last result we need is the decidability of a function post s ∆ (L) which, given a limit L, returns a nite set of limits {L 1 , . . . , L n } such that post s ∆ ( L )↓ = L 1 ∪ . . . ∪ L n . e challenge is representing all the possible successors of processes in L without having to enumerate L .
e key idea hinges again on the absorption axiom: we observe that to consider all possible process calls that may cause a transition, it is enough to unfold each ω in L by some bounded number b. Any transition taken from further unfoldings will give rise to successors that are congruent to some of the ones already considered. e bound b used in extending a limit, is de ned as a function of the process de nitions and the intruder model. e arity of a pa ern x : M is | x|. Given a set of de nitions ∆, β(∆) is the maximum arity of pa erns in ∆. e function γ(I) returns the maximum arity of the constructors in the signature of I.
Example
e limit L in Fig. 6 represents an inductive invariant for Example 2, under size bound 3. It can be proven invariant by checking that post 3 ∆ (L) is included in L. e invariant certi cates that any process in L is (3, 7)-bounded (note nest ν (L) = 7) and satis es secrecy. is applies to the initial process of Example 2 as P 0 ∈ L . In fact, L ω is also inductive, proving boundedness and secrecy for any process in (P 0 ) ω . Since νk.(νx.( x, e(x) k )) ω ⊆ L ω , L ω provides proof that the protocol is not susceptible to known-plaintext a acks. e invariant L was automatically inferred from P 0 using our prototype tool.
Algorithmic Aspects and Evaluation
In Section 3 we layed down the foundations for a theory of invariants for depth-bounded protocols. e algorithms presented in Section 3.1 have, however, very high complexity; in this section we summarise strategies that can be employed to obtain more e cient algorithms. e algorithms for inclusion and post can be used to check inductiveness given a candidate invariant. is leaves open the question of how to e ciently enumerate candidate invariants. An initial answer can be found in [28] which presents a framework for widening operators on ideal completions. It is not di cult to design a widening operator for bounded protocols inspired by the widening for the depth-bounded π-calculus of [28] . e basic observation is that from a sequence of transitions P 1 → * P 2 with P 1 kn P 2 , one can deduce that the same sequence can be simulated from P 2 (by eorem 1) obtaining a P 3 with P 2 kn P 3 and so on. One can then analyse the embedding between P 1 and P 2 , justi ed by P 1 ≡ kn ν x.( Γ 1 Q), P 2 ≡ kn ν x.( Γ 1 Q P ) extrapolate the di erence P and accellerate the sequence of transitions by constructing the limit ν x.( Γ 1 Q P ω ). e widening can be extended to limits. e end product is a nite union of limits which is inductive by construction. is procedure is still very computationally intensive: many inclusion checks are needed and the exploration of transitions can be costly. To obtain a more practical algorithm, we devised two techniques: inductiveness checks through "incorporation", and a coarser widening.
Consider the inductiveness check post s ∆ (L) ⊆ L implemented by checking that, for each transition considered by post the resulting limit L is included by L. We observe that L and L will share the context of the transition: Incorporation improves the performance of inductiveness dramatically. ere are cases, however, where the incorporation check fails on inductive invariants. Consider for example an inductive invariant represented by the union of two incomparable limits L 1 , L 2 . Suppose that for some P ∈ L 1 there is P with P → P ∈ L 2 \ L 1 . en, incorporation of P in L 1 would fail. To side-step this problem we replace union of limits with parallel composition: L 1 ∪ L 2 ⊆ L 1 L 2 by downward closure of -. Using this over-approximation, we can try to aim for an inductive invariant which consists of exactly one limit, and for which the incorporation check su ces. e over-approximation is incomplete: there are protocols for which there are only inductive invariants consisting of unions of incomparable limits.
Evaluation We built a proof-of-concept prototype tool implementing limit inclusion, inductivity check, incorporation and a coarse widening. Currently, the tool only supports symmetric encryption, but we plan to add support for asymmetric encryption, signatures and hashing. e sourcecode and all the test protocol models are available at https://bitbucket.org/ bordaigorl/lemma9. We summarise our experiments in Table 1 . e times are taken by running the tool with Python 2.7, z3-solver v4.8, 8GB RAM, Intel CPU i5, on Linux. e tool is instructed to compute, using the widening, an invariant for the provided model, under given message size assumptions. When an invariant can be found, it represents a proof that the model is depth-bounded. If the model encodes secrecy (with the pa ern explained in Section 3.1) if the inferred invariant is leak-free, secrecy is also proven. We model a number of well-known protocols under various threat scenarios (e.g. with or without leak of old keys). For any example containing a problematic encryption oracle pa ern (see Example 5) we constrain the input message of the oracle to be a nonce (message of size 1). With the exception of NHSr, ORa and YAHlk, all the invariants were obtained fully automatically. For YAHlk we had to combine two widened limits (the timing is the sum of the time spent computing each limit); for NHSr and ORa we had to tweak a partially widened limit manually to make it inductive. To simulate using invariants as correctness certi cates, for each example we re-checked them for inductiveness. e Needham-Schröder protocol [21] is modelled with and without secrecy (NHS/NHSs). e NHSr version models leaks of old session keys, which leads to a replay a ack (and hence the invariant is leaky). We provide four models of the Otway-Rees protocol [22] . OR does not model secrecy and is used to prove the protocol depth-bounded. ORl models secrecy but the inferred invariant contains a genuine leak, which is the result of a known type-confusion a ack. e a ack substitutes a composite message for some input x that is (wrongly) assumed to be a nonce by a principal. ORa models authentication and the invariant shows the genuine misauthentication based on this a ack. ORs models the same situation with the assumption that x is of size one; with this assumption the inferred invariant is not leaky.
ARPC models Lowe s modi ed BAN concrete ARPC protocol [18] (we model succ(-) with pair(-,-)). We modelled the Kehne-Schönwälder-Landendörfer protocol [18] , as modi ed by Lowe, with (KSLR) and without (KSL) re-authentication.
We produced four models of the Yahalom protocol [7] . Our rst model (YAH) does not model secrecy and is used to establish depth-boundedness. e protocol has a type-confusion a ack (similar to the case of Otway-Rees) which does not lead to a leak of a secret. is is modelled in YAHs1. We rule out this type-confusion by adding a size assumption in YAHs2. YAHlk is a variant where an additional fresh nonce is exchanged at the beginning of each session, which makes the protocol secret even when old session keys can be leaked, a property entailed by the inferred invariant.
Limitations Although in our examples we used (a)symmetric encryption, our framework is parametric on the intruder model. Indeed, De nition 1 supports models of many other cryptographic primitives such as signatures, hashing, XOR. e current limitation of our framework with respect to more powerful primitives, such as the notoriously di cult XOR or Di e Hellman exponentiation, is given by the (s, k)-bounded restriction: protocols like Di e Hellman Key Exchange, as modelled in our calculus, is not depth-bounded. At the core of the issue is the encryption oracle pa ern presented in Example 5. We are currently investigating extensions of the class of (s, k)-bounded protocols that accommodate safe uses of encryption oracles. e main idea is that, while oracles can be used by the intruder to create unbounded chains, these chains may never be inspected by principals, and thus are e ectively irrelevant. To weed out irrelevant chains we can make the intruder lazy: instead of generating full messages matching a pa ern in a transition, the intruder syntesizes a symbolic message which is speci ed only up to what is needed to make it match the pa ern. Pa ern variables will be bound to symbolic messages that can later be instantiated only if any principal will be able to pa ern match on them. Developing a theory of symbolic messages for depth-bounded invariants is a topic of future research.
Another limitation of the depth-bounded class is that it does not support protocols where principals form a linked-list/ring topology of arbitrary size, like the recursive protocol of [23, §6] . Since such topologies of xed size can be supported, a possible extension is to parametrise the models with the number n of nodes of the topology and study decidability of parametrised depth-bounded systems.
Conclusions and Future work
is paper presented a principled rst step in understanding automatic veri cation of cryptographic protocols without bounding the number of sessions/nonces. We studied the algebraic structure of depth-bounded protocols under absorbing intruder models, and proven decidability of inductiveness of downward-closed sets. On the practical side, we implemented an inductiveness checker in a proof-of-concept tool. e current version can be used interactively to construct candidate invariants, also with the help of a coarse widening. Our plan is to improve the widening by implementing a re nement loop that iteratively re nes an initial coarse invariant candidate, until one is found that proves the desired properties.
We can show that kn is NP-complete for I en [24] and in general for any intruder model that has polynomially decidable ≤ kn . From a theoretical perspective it would be interesting to determine precise complexity bounds for inclusion, for general intruder models.
Depth boundedness does limit the class of protocols we can verify with our techniques, and a primary goal of future work is to relax and generalise this class. Another direction for further improvement is extending the class of supported properties. In particular, we plan to study how invariants can be used to automatically prove di -equivalence [3] without bounding sessions/nonces. Finally, we intend to explore ways in which our invariants can be integrated in existing tools such as ProVerif and Tamarin. For instance, Tamarin performs a backwards search to nd possible a acks. Our invariants could provide a pruning technique to avoid exploring paths that are unreachable from the initial state. Similar combinations of forward and backward search has been shown to improve performance dramatically for analyses of in nite-state systems such as Petri nets [5] .
Appendix A Proof of Proposition 2
Rule I implies (Id); it is easy to check that any derivation for Γ M is also a derivation (of same depth) for Γ, Γ M , which implies (Mon); (Cut) is a consequence of the admissibility of the rule proven in [25] . e -R rules directly entail (Constr). All rules are invariant under renamings so (Alpha) holds. (Relevancy) can be proven by a straightforward induction on the depth of derivations. Since the premises in every rule involve only sub-terms of the consequence, derivability is decidable.
B Proof of Proposition 3
e "only if" direction is trivial. e "if" direction is proved as follows. Let sf(P i )
It is easy to check that P 1 kn P 2 if and only if Γ 1 ≤ kn Γ 2 , x 2 = x 1 y 2 for some y 2 , and Q 2 = Q 1 Q 2 for some parallel composition of process calls Q 2 . Similarly, P 2 kn P 1 if and only if Γ 2 ≤ kn Γ 1 , x 1 = x 2 y 1 , and Q 1 = Q 2 Q 1 for some y 1 , Q 1 . We get Γ 1 ∼ kn Γ 2 , x 1 = x 2 and Q 1 = Q 2 as required to prove P 1 ≡ kn P 2 .
C Auxiliary results

C.1 Properties of Knowledge
We have to show that for all N , if Γ, Γ 1 N then Γ 2 N . We apply (Cut) n times obtaining From Γ 1 ≤ kn Γ 2 we have ∀i ≤ n : Γ 2 M i , which implies, by (Mon), all the le -most premises. By (Mon), from Γ, Γ 1 N we know Γ, Γ 1 , Γ 2 N , which completes the derivation showing Γ, Γ 2 N .
Proof. Easy corollary of Lemma 5:
C.2 Properties of kn
Corollary 2. Let Γ ∈ K and P 1 , P 2 ∈ P with sf(P i ) = ν x i .( Γ i Q i ) for i ∈ {1, 2} and P 1 kn P 2 . en, Γ P 1 kn Γ P 2 .
Lemma 7. Let P 1 , P 2 ∈ P and n ∈ N. If P 1 kn P 2 , then P n First we strengthen the statement: we can prove that if F Q 1 k F F Q 2 k then sf(Q 1 ) = ν y.R and sf(Q 2 ) = ν y.ν z.(R R ), which clearly implies Q 1 kn Q 2 . We proceed by induction on k. e base case is a special case of the induction step, so let us consider the la er rst. Assume nest ν (Q 1 ), nest ν (Q 2 ) ≤ k + 1 and
). en, by de nition, there is an injective function f : supp(ϕ 1 ) → supp(ϕ 2 ) such that for each P ∈ B, P = f (P ) and ϕ 1 (P ) ≤ ϕ 2 (P ); moreover, for each ϕ ∈ C, ϕ F f (ϕ) and ϕ 1 (ϕ) ≤ ϕ 2 (ϕ). By de nition of F -we know that each ϕ ∈ C is the forest encoding F P 1 k for some subterm (α-equivalent to) νx k+1 .P ϕ of Q 1 with nest ν (P ϕ ) ≤ nest ν (Q 1 ) − 1 ≤ k. Similarly for Q 2 we have f (ϕ) = F P f (ϕ) k for some subterm νx k+1 .P f (ϕ) with nest ν (P f (ϕ) ) ≤ nest ν (Q 2 )−1 ≤ k. We can therefore apply the induction hypothesis and get ϕ F f (ϕ) implies that sf(P ϕ ) = ν y ϕ .R ϕ and sf(P f (ϕ) ) = ν y ϕ .ν z ϕ .(R ϕ R ϕ ). As a consequence of this and of ϕ 1 (ϕ) ≤ ϕ 2 (ϕ), we have
which clearly entails the claim, by application of α-renaming and scope extrusion to get the two standard forms. In the base case, C = ∅ from which the claim follows straightforwardly.
D.2 Proof of eorem 4
We want to prove that for every L ∈ L s,k , we have L ⊆ D s,k and L is kn -downward closed and directed. Clearly L ⊆ D s,k since every P ∈ [ L ] has nest ν (P ) ≤ nest ν (L) ≤ k and its active messages are the messages of L up to renaming (which does not alter size).
L is downward closed by de nition. Proving that L is directed requires showing that for each P 1 , P 2 ∈ L , there is Q ∈ L such that P 1 kn Q and P 2 kn Q. Such Q can be constructed by applying Lemma 11 to P 1 and P 2 , obtaining n 1 and n 2 such that P i kn L ni , for i = 1, 2. en Q = L max(n1,n2) is the required process by Lemma 10.
D.3 Proof of eorem 5
e idea of the proof is to use the forest encoding F -to apply known facts about the ideal completion for multisets to our se ing. We take an ideal of D s,k and show it corresponds to a downward closed set of F s,k , via forest encoding. For multisets we know exactly how to represent ideals [15] , i.e. -products. ese products are expressions that can be readily seen as limits. Let us recall the result on multisets rst and then proceed with the proof.
Let X be a wqo with a nite representation of ideals I(X). en we can nitely represent ideals of M(X) by expressions of the form p = I 1 · · · I n J ?
When n, m = 0 we write p = . Such expressions are called -products. eir denotations are the ideals of M(X), via the map
In a wqo, downward closed sets are nite unions of ideals, so any downward closed set of M(X) can be described as the union of the denotation of nitely many -products. For the details 3 see [15] .
Another well-known property of ideals we are going to use is the following. Let D be a downward closed set, then the following are equivalent:
Now we turn to our theorem. Let D ⊆ D s,k , we de ne F D k := {F P | P ∈ D, nest ν (P ) ≤ k}.
By de nition, F D k ⊆ F s,k . We also de ne the opposite mapping, from forests to processes in the expected way. Let ϕ ∈ F X s,k , B(ϕ) := supp(ϕ) ∩ B s (X) and C(ϕ) := supp(ϕ) \ B(ϕ). en P ϕ k := P ∈B(ϕ) P ϕ(P ) ψ∈C(ϕ) (νx k .P ψ k−1 ) ϕ(ψ)
Since when k = 0, C(ϕ) = ∅, the expression is well-de ned. We have P ϕ k ⊆ D s,k and 4 F P ϕ k k = ϕ and P F Q k k ≡ Q (when de ned).
Proof. First note that for each P ∈ D there is a Q ≡ kn P in D such that F Q ∈ F D k . Towards a contradiction, assume there is a forest ϕ ∈ F s,k such that there is a ψ ∈ F D k with ϕ F ψ but ϕ ∈ F D k . We know that ψ = F P k for some P ∈ D. From Lemma 3 we can derive that P ϕ k kn P . But since D is downward closed, P ϕ k ∈ D, which contradicts the assumption that ϕ ∈ F D k .
Proof of eorem 5 We prove, by induction on k, that Idl(D X s,k ) ⊆ L s,k . Again, the base case is a special case of the induction step. Let k > 0 and D ∈ Idl(D X s,k ); By induction hypothesis, we can assume that the ideals of D X s,k−1 are described by limits in L X s,k−1 . Since D is downward closed, by Lemma 15, F D k ⊆ F s,k is downward closed as well, and thus is the nite union of some ideals of F X s,k . Now we have,
. Let p 1 , . . . , p n be such that n i=1 p i = F D k . From each p i we can obtain a limit L pi by replacing:
We now show that D = n i=1 L pi . It is important to remember that p i are F -ideals while L pi are kn -ideals. One can show, by induction on the structure of p i , that Q ∈ [ L pi ] if and only if Q ≡ Q for some Q ∈ P p i . It then follows that L pi = {Q | ∃ϕ ∈ p i : Q kn P ϕ } and therefore
We thus established that D = n i=1 L pi . Since D is an ideal and each L pi is downward closed, we have that D = L pj for some 1 ≤ j ≤ n. We proceed by induction on the depth of the derivation for Γ, Γ M . We assume the statement holds for derivations of depth d and do a case analysis on the last rule applied in the (d + 1)-deep derivation for Γ, Γ M .
We then have two cases: Case (N 1 , N 2 ) ∈ Γ . We can transform the d-deep derivation for Γ, Γ , N 1 , N 2 M into a derivation for Γ, N 1 , N 2 , Γ , N 1 σ, N 2 σ M of the same depth, by (Mon). Since M ⊆ names(Γ, N 1 , N 2 ) = names(Γ ) and by de nition Γ , N 1 σ, N 2 σ = (Γ, N 1 , N 2 )σ, we can apply the induction hypothesis, obtaining Γ, N 1 , N 2 M which proves Γ M by application of Rule PL.
We have names(N 1 ), names(N 1 ) ⊆ names(Γ ) so we can apply the induction hypothesis to the two premises and get Γ N 1 and Γ N 2 , which proves Γ M by Rule PR.
Rule SR: Analogous to the case of Rule PR. Rule AR: Analogous to the case of Rule PR.
F Proof of Characterisation of Limits Inclusion
For any limit L with standard form ν x.( Γ Q i∈I B ω i ), we call Γ and Q non-iterated, also xed, components while B i for i ∈ I are iterated components.
We recall the statement: Let L 1 and L 2 be two limits, with sf(L 1 )
, and let n = | x 1 | + |Q 1 | + 1. en: Proof. Given that (A) and (B) hold, it su ces to show that
by Lemmas 12 and 13. Let n 1 be an arbitrary number. With
) for some n 2 . Condition (A) induces a knowledge order for both xed parts. Condition (B) gives rise to some relation between the iterated components we will exploit. is relation is captured in the following fact. For some α-renaming in (A) and some n 2 :
Prior to proving ( * ), we show that this fact and (A) su ce to prove our goal. With sf(
Because of ( * ), we can choose y 2 so that y 2 = y 1 , z 2 and there is no need to rename for the embedding anymore. Equipped with this abbreviation, the knowledge of the le hand side (ν
is the knowledge of the right hand side ν
. is is also exactly the knowledge contained in (
by ( * ). It remains to take care of names and process calls for the embedding. Condition (A) already takes care of non-iterated names and process calls. With our assumption ( * ), we obtain
Both parts are knowledge congruent to our goal's sides by Lemma 6 which proves the goal.
It remains to show that ( * ), i.e.
) for some n 2 . We start with (B) and apply Lemma 12 so that we know that for every n 1 ∈ N, there is a m ∈ N such that Γ 1 i∈I B 1 n1 kn Γ 2 R 2 m . By Lemma 7, we multiply on both sides:
By Lemma 6, we pull the messages out of both replications:
We continue on both sides individually. On the le , we omit messages for simplicity as we already know that Γ 1 ≤ kn Γ 2 .
While we use Lemma 8 and Corollary 2 on the right in order to obtain that:
Combining both paths leads to:
. By choosing n 2 = n 1 · m, the claim follows. For this proof we are assuming the intruder model is absorbing. Before we give the proof, we need some auxiliary de nitions and results. Proof.
e direction from right to le is obvious. For the reverse direction, it is equivalent to show that Γ, Γ 1 , Γ, Γ 2 M . Now, Γ, Γ 1 = (Γ, Γ 2 )[ y/ x]. e claim follows by the assumption that the intruder is absorbing (De nition 8).
Lemma 18. Let L, L be two limits such that L ≡ L . en for every n ∈ N : L n ≡ L n .
Proof.
e proof is a straightforward structural induction on L.
We introduce a re nement of grounding and a function folding the right hand side but preserving the knowledge embedding. e (n, k, m)-th grounding takes a limit and unfolds each ω n times for the outer k nested levels of ω, and m times for the inner ones.
De nition 10 (Step-indexed grounding). For a limit L in standard form, we de ne the (n, k, m)-th grounding of L to be the process L n,k,m recursively:
De nition 11 (ω-height). For a limit L, we de ne the ω-height as follows:
Lemma 19. Let L be a limit and m, n, k ∈ N. If k ≥ ω-height(L), then L n,k,m = L n .
Proof. e parameter k only decreases when recursing into a limit under ω. If k ≥ ω-height(L) the last case of the de nition will never apply, which makes the de nition coincide with the one of n-grounding. e idea of the following parametrised function is to fold an m-grounding to an n-grounding up to a certain ω-height k of the limit. Since we want to be very speci c about the domains, we de ne some sets of groundings.
De nition 12 (Set of groundings). Let L ∈ L and m, n, k ∈ N. We de ne the following two sets of processes: We may omit the parameters n and m in the following if obvious from context as they do not change over the process of folding.
Lemma 20 (Folding is sound wrt. knowledge embedding). Let L 1 , L 2 be two limits in standard form
If there is a m ∈ N such that m > n and L 1 0 kn L 2 m , then ∀k :
Proof. We prove the claim by induction on k.
For k = 0, the claim trivially follows as Φ n,m 0,L2 ( L 2 m ) = L 2 m by the assumption that L 1 0 kn L 2 m holds. For the induction step, we assume that L 1 0 kn Φ n,m k,L2 ( L 2 m ) and prove
By de nition of folding, both Φ k,L ( L 2 m ) and Φ k+1,L ( L 2 m ) are folding in exactly the same way up to the k-th recursive calls, i.e. calls in which k decreases. is means that up to the calls to Φ 0,L and Φ 1,L , both Φ k,L ( L 2 m ) and Φ k+1,L ( L 2 m ) will have constructed the same context C[−, · · · , −] around these nal calls. We thus characterise A = Φ n,m k,L2 ( L 2 m ), and B = Φ n,m k+1,L2 ( L 2 m ) as follows:
and want to prove that
Intuitively, we have to nd a way to preserve the knowledge embedding from (1) when removing some branches in the holes of the context to get from A to B. Let us show what A and B look like explicitly with their context:
We call Γ c the knowledge of the context. Our goal is to show that reducing the number of iterations in each of D's parallel components does not a ect the knowledge embedding described in (i) and thereby obtain (ii). Let us rst consider names and process calls. We can split L 1 0 in the following way:
where y ⊆ c and Q y ⊆ Q c . e intention is to distinguish names and process calls that are already matched in the context. is is why we do not require all process calls that are only using names from y to be in Q y but some of them might be in Q z . e goal follows with the following claim immediately. Claim I: In every hole of context C[−, · · · , −], we can reduce the number of branches to at most n, i.e. for every 1 ≤ l ≤ j we can have a grounding F l n instead of F j m .
Proof of Claim I. Towards a contradiction, assume that there is a hole in which we cannot remove m − n branches. W.l.o.g. let L l m for 1 ≤ l ≤ j be the sublimit in this hole. ere might be three reasons for this: names, process calls and knowledge.
Considering the names and process calls, we know that | x 1 | + |Q 1 | < n by de nition and hence | z| + |Q z | < n. Now, we investigate the components that z and Q z are matched to. In the worst case, all of them are mapped to this hole but we still delete m − n branches that are not used to match the names z. For the process calls in Q z , we have to distinguish two cases. First, if a process call uses any name from z, it is ne as we will leave them anyway. Second, if a process call does not use any name from z, it is ne to delete this branch as there will be enough copies in the remaining branches to cover this process call.
It remains to reason about knowledge. We make the knowledge of D, i.e. the one having budget k, explicit: sf(D) = ν a.(Γ m · · · ) and factor out the knowledge from sublimit F l m : Γ m = Γ m , Γ l,m so that Γ l,m was the knowledge obtained through F l m . For knowledge, we have to prove that Γ 1 ≤ kn Γ c , Γ m , Γ l,n . By Proposition 1, we need to prove that for every message M ∈ Γ 1 , Γ c , Γ m , Γ l,n M given that Γ c , Γ m , Γ l,m M . e idea now is to reduce the knowledge from Γ l,m to Γ l,n by Corollary 3, which is a corollary of the absorbing intruder. Let us de ne Γ c,m = Γ c , Γ m indicating the context of the hole we are considering. As m might be bigger than 2n, we have to iterate the process of reducing the number of branches. Hence, we generalise the notation of Γ l,m and Γ l,n in the following way:
Claim II: ∀m > n, Γ l,m M =⇒ Γ l,m−1 M . Proof of Claim II. For convenience, we rename Γ l,i to Λ i . e main observation is that we can split the knowledge Λ m into Λ m−1 and a remainder Λ . We can choose a branch which does not use names from z to contribute to Λ . Since we know that n ≥ 1, we know that m > 1 by assumption. erefore, we can split Λ m−1 again and obtain the knowledge stemming from one branch which we call Λ . Let us recall the assumption and goal a er these rewriting steps:
holds, we want to prove that Γ c,m , Λ m−2 , Λ M . Let w and w be the names only used in Λ and Λ respectively so that:
Λ and Λ have been obtained from a branch of the same sublimit, so we can infer that
Notice that w ∩ z = ∅ by the fact how we have chosen the branch for Λ . Furthermore, w ∩ y = ∅ by y ⊆ c. Combining these observations, we get that x 1 ∩ w = ∅. By the fact that M ∈ Γ 1 , we have names(M ) ⊆ names(Γ 1 ) ⊆ x 1 . erefore, names(M ) ∩ w = ∅ which implies that
Facts (3) to (6) ful l the conditions for Corollary 3, resulting in Γ c,m , Λ m−2 , Λ M which reads Γ c,m , Λ m−1 M when folding back which is the goal of Claim II. By this, we have shown that we can remove m − n branches which leads to a contradiction which is why Claim I holds. As F l m was chosen arbitrarily, we have shown that we can remove m − n branches in every hole of the context C[−, · · · , −] which concludes this proof. 
Proof. First, we show that sf(L 1 ) 0 kn L 2 n . By L 1 ⊆ L 2 , we know that there is an m so that sf(L 1 ) 0 kn L 2 m by Lemma 12. From Lemma 20, we obtain that that sf(L 1 ) 0 kn Φ n,m k,L2 ( L 2 m ) for every k. Substituting ω-height(L 2 ) for k leads to Φ n,m ω-height,L2 ( L 2 m ). is is L 2 n by Lemma 19. Using this knowledge embedding, we get L 2
With Lemma 14, we observe that L 2 n = L 2 ⊗ n 0 . By this, the claim follows as − 0 just omits the iterated parts, i.e. R 2 , from sf(L 2 ⊗ n).
Lemma 21 (Necessary Conditions for Inclusion). Let L 1 and L 2 be two limits, with sf(L 1 )
Given that the inclusion L 1 ⊆ L 2 , both conditions (A) and (B) hold.
Proof. For (A), the claim follows by Corollary 4 which implicitly gives a renaming for L 2 .  For (B) , we want to show that Γ 1
is is why it is enough to show that N 1 ⊆ N 2 by transitivity. Towards a contradiction, we assume that for all possible renaming so that (A) is satis ed, N 1 ⊆ N 2 . By Lemma 12,
First, knowledge could break the embedding. Let us de ne
Notice that names(Γ i ) ∩ y i = ∅. ere might be two reasons why the knowledge embedding does not hold. First, the embedding breaks because of knowledge. is is impossible as Γ 1 , Γ 1 and Γ 2 , Γ 2 represent the knowledge of groundings of the two limits L 1 and L 2 as their top level knowledge is replicated in (B). erefore, the inclusion L 1 ⊆ L 2 would also break which is a contradiction.
Second, names or process calls can hence be the only reasons why the knowledge embedding N 1 m 1 kn N 2 m2 does not hold for any m 2 . We will derive a contradiction by choosing
. By the size of n 1 , at least half of the names and process calls of R 1 n1 have to be covered by R 2 m2 as the non-iterated part x 2 and Q 2 cannot do more than half. But by de nition n1 2 ≥ m 1 so ∀m 2 , R 1 n 1 2 kn R 2 m2 as knowledge cannot be the reason for (7) to break. Altogether, this entails that there is a n 1 such that for all m 2 :
Using Lemma 13, this implies that L 1 n1 kn L 2 m2 for every m 2 . In turn, this entails that L 1 ⊆ L 2 by Lemma 12 which is a contradiction.
F.3 Correctness of post
De nition 14 (β(∆) and b). Let ∆ be a set of de nitions. We de ne β(∆) and γ(I) as follows: Corollary 5 (Post of Expansion is enough). Let L be a limit and P ∈ L . en, for every P 1 ∈ post(P ), there is a P 2 ∈ post( L n ) for some n ∈ N such that P 1 kn P 2 .
Proof. As P ∈ L , we know that there is a n ∈ N such that P kn L n by Lemma 11. We choose this n to be n. We have that P → P 1 and P kn L n . As kn is a simulation ( eorem 1), we know that there is a P 2 so that L n → P 2 and P 1 kn P 2 .
Let us recall the theorem we want to prove: for all L ∈ L s,k ,
Proof (Proof of eorem 8). We assume that post s ∆ (L) = {L 1 , . . . , L n } and prove the set equality by inclusion in both directions.
First, we show that post( L ) ∩ S s ↓ ⊇ L 1 ∪ . . . ∪ L n . It su ces to show that L j ⊆ post( L ) ∩ S s ↓ for every j ∈ {1, · · · , n}. We choose j arbitrarily and prove the la er statement. By de nition, we know that L j stems from at least one transition in the non-iterated
With Lemma 11, we know that for every P ∈ L j , there is a m so that P kn L j m . By downward-closure, we infer that
. By Corollary 5, it su ces to consider only successors of groundings of L. erefore, let b < m ∈ N with sf( L m )
. We consider the three di erent reduction rules that can be red starting from this grounding:
a principal is waiting for some message on a private channel which is derivable and the pa ern can be matched by Γ a principal would like to send a message on some private channel which can be derived from the environment one principal sends a message on a private channel to another principal We split the parts into three paragraphs.
Public Private Channel, Message Input We have Q[ M ] := a( p : N ).P 1 + A for some private channel a and action A. W.l.o.g, we derive the message which is matched using some fresh intruder names c: Γ 1 , c N [ M / x] and the channel name a can be derived by assumption: Γ 1 , Γ 2 a. Overall, we get the following transition:
where the annotations explicitly state which process call and action was used with which substitution. We want to show that we can have the same reduction in L b . We do so by using the Φ function as in Lemma 20 to relate the di erence between iterating k times and k + 1 times.
Claim I: For every k ∈ N, ∃ y k , ∆ k , D k such that 
with ∆ k , c N [ M / p] and ∆ k , c a. Proof of Claim I by induction on k: For the base case in which k = 0, the claim holds by assumption. For the induction step, we assume that (8) holds for k and we prove it for k + 1. Similar to the proof of Lemma 20, we use a multi-hole context C[−, · · · , −] to distinguish between having budget k or k + 1. Let F 1 , · · · , F j be j limits and C[−, · · · , −] a multi-hole context so that:
We want to show that it su ces to have b copies of F l for any 1 ≤ l ≤ j. Since Q[ M ] also occurs in sf( L b ), it is trivial to keep the process call which is reduced. It remains to argue that the same redex is enabled in B. Towards a contradiction: Assume that there is a hole in which b copies are not su cient. W.l.o.g. let L l be the limit in this hole. We did not explicitly single out the message N [ M / p] but only the substitution [ M / p] for the continuation since the substitution is solely determining the successor.
We know that A's knowledge is ∆ k and factor out the knowledge from sublimit F l m : ∆ k = ∆ k , ∆ l,m so that ∆ l,m was the knowledge obtained through F l m . We want to prove that ∆ k , ∆ l,m , c N [ M / p] =⇒ ∆ k , ∆ l,b , c N [ M / p] where ∆ l,b denotes the knowledge obtained through F l b respectively. Now, we consider the di erent names used in N [ M / p]. It is straightforward to see that names(N ) ⊆ x 1 . Recall the de nition of b: b := β(∆) · γ(I) s−1 + 1 By this, we know that β(∆) ≥ | p| and hence b ≥ | p| · γ(I) s−1 + 1. Intuitively, this ensures that there are enough distinct names for every single parameter in the parameter list as well as for channel a as the size determines the maximum depth of the syntax tree of a message. As names( p) < b, we can remove at least m − b branches without loosing names used in p or channel name a. erefore, we can assume that names(N [ M / p]) ∪ {a} ⊆ x 1 . e idea is to reduce the knowledge from ∆ l,m to ∆ l,b by Corollary 3, which is a corollary of the absorbing intruder. As m might be bigger than 2b, we have to iterate the process of reducing the number of branches. Hence, we generalise the notation of ∆ l,m and ∆ l,b in the obvious way: ( F l m ) i ≡ ν a i .(∆ l,i · · · ). Proof of Claim II. For convenience, we rename ∆ l,i to Λ i . e main observation is that we can split the knowledge Λ m into Λ m−1 and a remainder Λ . We can choose a branch which does not use names from x 1 to contribute to Λ . Since we know that n ≥ 1, we know that m > 1 by assumption. erefore, we can split Λ m−1 again and obtain the knowledge stemming from one branch which we call Λ . Let us recall the assumption and goal a er these rewriting steps: Given that 
Notice that w ∩ 
Facts (9) to (12) In turn, this concludes the proof of Claim I. Instantiating the statement of Claim I with k > ω-height(L) shows that this transition is still enabled in L b . We prove that the same holds for transitions enabled by the remaining reduction rules.
Public Private Channel, Message Output Recall that sf( L m )
. We have Q[ M ] := a M .P 1 + A for some private channel a and action A. e channel name a can be derived by assumption: Γ 1 a. Overall, we get the following transition: and the channel name a can be derived by assumption: Γ 1 , Γ 2 a. We want to show that we can have the same reduction in L b . We sketch the proof that this transition is still enabled as it is analogous to the rst proof. We start with an analogous claim.
Claim I: In every hole of context C[−, · · · , −], we can reduce the number of branches to at most n, i.e. for every j we can have a grounding F j n instead of F j m . for every k ∈ N:
It is obvious to see that the side condition is subsumed by (8) which we have used in the rst case and hence the proof could be proceeded in the same way.
Private Channel, Two Participants For the last case, we consider:
] c( x : N ).P 2 + A 2 e resulting transition looks as follows:
ere are no side conditions on derivability in this case so we only have to ensure that all possible combiniations of c N [ M / x] .P 1 and c( x : N ).P 2 can occur. As both actions could stem from the same process call, it su ces to have an expansion factor greater or equal to 2. is only poses restrictions on β and γ. By de nition of b, we need to ensure that β(∆) · γ(I) s−1 ≥ 1. As argued before, considering s < 2 is unreasonable since it would be impossible to have encryptions in this se ing. Hence, even if γ(I) was 0, γ(I) s−1 ≥ 1 for reasonable s. If β(∆) < 1, it is 0 and hence the transition we consider would be impossible. We therefore can assume that β(∆) > 0. Hence, we know that b ≥ 2 and this su ces to have a congruent transition in L b .
We now turn back to our general goal and know that all kinds of transitions are enabled in L b . Consider the extension L ⊗ b of limit L whose standard form we choose to resemble the correlation with L b : sf(L ⊗ b) α = ν x 1 .(Γ 1 Q[ M ] C 1 R 1 ). By the de nition of post(L), we know that L := ν x 1 .( Γ 1 P 1 [ M / p] C 1 R 1 ) ∈ post(L).
Recall that Q = ν x 1 , x 2 , c.( Γ 1 Γ 2 c P 1 [ M / p] C 1 ) was the successor of L m from the beginning. It remains to show that Q ∈ L . As before for L ⊗ b, we relate the standard form of L ⊗ m to L m and get the following:
By Lemma 13, we have that L ⊗ m = L ⊗ b and taking one step hence leads to 
